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AARTICLESMoral Understanding as Knowing Right
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Paulina Sliwa
Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic and moral good. I argue that moral
understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. I defend the account
against challenges from nonreductionists, such as Alison Hills, who argue that
moral understanding is distinct from moral knowledge. Moral understanding, she
suggests, is constituted by a set of abilities: to give and follow moral explanations
and to draw moral conclusions. I argue that Hills’s account rests on too narrow a
conception of moral understanding. Among other things, it cannot account for
the importance of first-personal experience for achievingmoral understanding.I. INTRODUCTION
Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic good. It’s something we
look for when deciding whom to rely on for moral advice. It’s a goal of
moral education: something we hope to instill in our children. And it’s
an integral part of moral wisdom: a moral sage is someone who has pro-
found moral understanding.
It’s natural to think of moral understanding and moral knowledge
as closely related epistemic phenomena. We say that moral understand-
ing is a matter of knowing right from wrong. Typical sources of moral* This article has been presented at the University of Nottingham, the University of
Zurich, and the University of Bristol. I am grateful to the audiences there for their com-
ments and questions and to Alexander Bird, Sophie Horowitz, Rae Langton, and Katia
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Aknowledge—thinking hard about a moral question or having firsthand
experiences—are also sources of moral understanding.
This intuitive thought has lately come under sustained attack. In a
recent paper, Alison Hills argues that moral understanding “is an impor-
tant epistemic state with a different role to that traditionally filled by prop-
ositional knowledge.”1 Hills’s approach is in tune with a general trend in
epistemology, where there has been a lot of interest in how understand-
ing relates to knowledge. The assumption that understanding differs in
several crucial ways from knowledge is a common starting point.2 Let’s
call the claim thatmoral knowledge andmoral understanding are distinct
nonreductionism.
Nonreductionists point to several motivations for their approach.
They note the received wisdom that it’s easier to come to know something
than it is to come to understand it. They point out that we often attribute
knowledge without attributing understanding. And, in particular, they
suggest that, unlike understanding, knowledge can be easily acquired
and passed on through testimony. Thus, asHills argues: “[A] centrally im-
portant concept in moral epistemology is not moral knowledge, but what
I call moral understanding, and . . . the latter relates to testimony and to
expertise quite differently from the former.”3
What grounds this alleged difference betweenmoral understanding
and moral knowledge? Hills argues that, unlike knowing why p, under-
standing why p involves a range of abilities. When q is why p, understand-
ing why p requires the abilities to:
i) follow an explanation of why p given by someone else;
ii) explain why p in your own words;
iii) draw the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the infor-
mation that q;
iv) draw the conclusion that p0 (or that probably p0) from the in-
formation that q0 (where p0 and q0 are similar to but not iden-
tical to p and q);1. Allison Hills, “Understanding Why,” Noûs 50 (2016): 661–88, 662.
2. For examples, see Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Under-
standing (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002); Catherine Z. Elgin, “True Enough,”
Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 113–31, and “Understanding and the Facts,” Philosophical Studies
132 (2007): 33–42; Michael Strevens, “No Understanding without Explanation,” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013): 510–15; Linda Zagzebski, “Recovering Under-
standing,” in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Vir-
tue, ed. Matthias Steup (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 235–52; Duncan
Pritchard, “Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value,” Grazer Philosophische
Studien 77 (2008): 325–39, and “Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value,” Royal In-
stitute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (2009): 19–43.
3. Alison Hills, “Moral Testimony andMoral Epistemology,” Ethics 120 (2009): 94–127,
97.
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Av) given the information that p, give the right explanation, q;
vi) given the information that p0, give the right explanation, q0.4
Hills argues that these abilities are both necessary and quite likely suffi-
cient for having moral understanding: “These abilities are, I think, indi-
vidually necessary for moral understanding, and I suspect that they may
be jointly sufficient, provided that it is true that p and that q is why p
(though I am open to the possibility that other abilities may be required
in addition).”5 The abilities that Hills identifies all concern moral rea-
soning and reflection. On Hills’s view then, understanding why an ac-
tion is morally wrong requires the ability to engage in moral reasoning
about why it’s wrong, where moral reasoning includes the ability to give
and follow explanations. I will refer to this thought as the moral reason-
ing claim.6
My aim in this article is to motivate and defend an alternative pic-
ture of moral understanding. The basic idea I will develop is that moral
understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. There are many
ways in which we can achieve moral understanding: by perception, by
first-personal experience, and even by moral testimony. In particular,
agents can achieve moral understanding of why, for example, sexual ha-
rassment is morally wrong even when they lack the ability to articulate
their understanding. This picture respects the intuitive thought that moral
understanding and moral knowledge are closely related; it’s reductionist.
And, contra themoral reasoning claim, it offers a considerably broader con-
ception of moral understanding.
Here’s the plan: I will start by clarifying the terms of the debate. I
suggest that we need to draw a distinction between specific instances
(or achievements) of moral understanding and the capacity of moral un-
derstanding. This gives us a better grip on the central elements of Hills’s
account. I argue that nonreductionism is most plausibly taken as a claim
about instances of moral understanding, while the moral reasoning claim
targets the capacity of moral understanding. I then argue against these4. Ibid., 102–3.
5. Ibid., 103.
6. Hills is not the only proponent of the moral reasoning claim. Strevens, “No Under-
standing without Explanation,” 515, suggests that “to understand a moral rule might be to
grasp a correct moral explanation of the rule (perhaps a derivation of the rule from fun-
damental moral principles) or to have the ability to use the rule to explain moral facts (for
example, why lying is usually wrong).” More generally, philosophers of science have been
emphasizing the relationship between understanding and explanation. Similarly, Kvanvig,
Value of Knowledge, 198, suggests that the ability to answer requests for explanation about a
subject is constitutive of understanding. See, also, Kareem Khalifa, “The Role of Explana-
tion in Understanding,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2013): 161–87. For a
dissenting view, see Peter Lipton, “Understanding without Explanation,” in Scientific Under-
standing: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Hans W. de Regt et al. (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 2009), 43–63.
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Atwo claims separately. Sections III and IV make a case for reductionism.
Section V argues that identifying the capacity of moral understanding
with the capacity for moral reasoning is too narrow; in particular, it can-
not account for the role of first-personal experience in moral under-
standing. These two strands of argument together motivate an alterna-
tive approach to moral understanding. I develop this account, the Moral
Knowledge Account, in Section VI. Section VII responds to a central ob-
jection to the Moral Knowledge Account.
II. MORAL UNDERSTANDING: ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS CAPACITY
We need to distinguish between the capacity of moral understanding
and particular instances of moral understanding. These two are impor-
tantly different, and for the purposes of giving a philosophical account
we need to keep track of which one we have in mind. To credit people
with an instance of moral understanding is to say that they have achieved
a particular mental state—for example, the mental state of understand-
ing why one should not sleep with someone too drunk to give consent or
why one should not spank one’s children. In contrast, to credit people
with moral understanding simpliciter is to attribute to them a capacity:
the capacity to achieve instances of moral understanding. This is just
an instance of a more general distinction between an epistemic faculty
and those states that are the output of this faculty. For example, we dis-
tinguish between color vision and seeing that the apple is red or between
sense of pitch and hearing that the note is c2. The former is a capacity or
ability; the latter is a mental state acquired by exercising this capacity.
Agents can have the capacity of moral understanding even when
they have not achieved some particular instance ofmoral understanding.
Thus, for example, people may fail to understand why the death penalty
is wrong because they have been presented with misleading evidence
about how it’s administered and its deterrent effect. They may neverthe-
less have the capacity of moral understanding: were they presented with
nonmisleading evidence, they would achieve an instance of moral under-
standing why the death penalty is wrong.
Agents can have the capacity of moral understanding and fail to ex-
ercise it—either by choice or circumstances. But to have this capacity,
they need to be able to exercise it: there needs to be an existing cogni-
tive mechanism that, employed correctly, will yield instances of moral un-
derstanding. Thus, a newborn does not (yet) have the capacity of moral
understanding, just as the newborn does not (yet) have the capacity to
speak English. Rather, she has the disposition to acquire and develop
these capacities.
For clarity’s sake, I will use the terms “capacity of moral understand-
ing” versus “instances of moral understanding” or “achievements of moral
understanding” in what follows. (I’ll use the latter two interchangeably.)This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on April 12, 2017 04:07:50 AM
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AWith this distinction on the table, let’s go back to nonreductionism and the
moral reasoning claim.
In her discussion, Hills presents nonreductionism and the moral
reasoning claim as a package deal: she argues that moral understanding
involves abilities for moral reasoning by arguing that moral understand-
ing differs frommoral knowledge.7 But note that the two claims are inde-
pendent. Consider first nonreductionism. Hills argues that moral under-
standing is an epistemic state distinct from moral knowledge. To defend
it, she points to cases in which an agent purportedly understands why
someone is evil without knowing why the person is evil. Thus, it’s most
natural to understand nonreductionism as a claim about the nature of
instances of moral understanding. Nonreductionism says that the men-
tal state of understanding why an action is right and the mental state of
knowing why it’s right are two different mental states. An agent can be in
the former without being in the latter.
The moral reasoning claim, on the other hand, is plausibly a claim
about the capacity of moral understanding. It says which abilities are con-
stitutive of this capacity, namely, the abilities to give moral explanations,
to draw the relevant conclusions, to justify one’s conclusion in one’s own
words, and so on. Thus, Eleanor’s moral understanding of a particular
moral subject matter—animal welfare, for example—is constituted by her
ability to reason about this subject matter: to draw conclusions, justify
them, give explanations.
To see that these claims are independent, notice that we can accept
themoral reasoning claim and deny nonreductionism and vice versa. On
the former, the capacity of moral understanding is the capacity for moral
reasoning. An agent achieves an instance of moral understanding when
she acquires moral knowledge by exercising her capacity for moral rea-
soning. The latter denies that the capacity ofmoral understanding is con-
stituted by the ability for moral reasoning but nevertheless insists that in-
stances of understanding are a distinct type of mental state.
The next two sections focus on instances of moral understanding,
arguing in favor of reductionism. For this purpose, I will simply concede
that the moral reasoning claim is correct; that is, that the capacity of
moral understanding is the capacity to engage in moral reasoning.8
III. DEFENDING REDUCTIONISM: KNOWLEDGE IS NECESSARY
FOR ACHIEVING UNDERSTANDING
We have seen that according to nonreductionism, achievements of moral
understanding are different mental states from instances of moral knowl-7. See Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology.” A similar argument is of-
fered by Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge; Strevens, “No Understanding without Explanation”;
and Pritchard, Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.
8. I revisit this concession in Sec. V.
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Aedge. In contrast, reductionism is committed to the claim that when an
agent understands why an action is right or wrong this is in virtue of hav-
ing knowledge about why it’s right or wrong. According to reductionism,
knowledge is all there is to understanding; there is no need to stipulate a
novel cognitive state that goes over and beyond knowledge. Reduction-
ism thusmakes ametaphysical claim. Just as physicalists about themental
say that every mental state is constituted by a physical state, so reduction-
ists about understanding say that every instance of understanding is con-
stituted by an instance of knowledge.
This section argues, contra Hills, that instances of knowledge are
necessary for instances of understanding. The next section takes up the
question whether knowledge is all there is to instances of understanding.
Hills’s Argument from Epistemic Luck
Hills argues that knowledge is not necessary for achieving moral under-
standing, since instances of moral understanding have a different rela-
tionship to epistemic luck than knowledge. Hills appeals to the following
case: “Suppose that your school has been sent a set of extremely inaccu-
rate textbooks, which have been handed out to your class. But you are
very lucky because there is only one that is accurate, and by chance you
have it. You read in your book that Stalin was responsible for the deaths
of millions of people. You draw the obvious conclusion that he was an
evil person.”9 According toHills, you don’t know why Stalin was evil, since
you do not know that he killed millions. Nevertheless, Hills suggests, you
understand why Stalin was evil. And so, an agent can have moral under-
standing even in the absence of moral knowledge. More generally, Hills
argues, following Kvanvig and Pritchard, that understanding is immune
to environmental epistemic luck—the kind of luck exemplified in fake
barn cases.10
Let’s grant that in this case you do not know why Stalin is evil.11 But
why should we accept that you nevertheless understand why he’s evil?
Hills argues that you understand why he is evil because you formed your
true belief that Stalin was evil by exercising your capacity for moral rea-
soning. Moral understanding is the capacity to engage in moral reason-
ing. And if you form a true belief about why Stalin is evil by exercising
the capacity of moral understanding, you thereby understand why Stalin9. Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” 204. Hills’s argument mirrors
those made earlier by Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge.
10. The argument below also responds to those who argue that understanding does
not require knowledge because it is not factive; e.g., Elgin, “True Enough.”
11. This is not uncontroversial. See Stephen Grimm, “Is Understanding a Species of
Knowledge?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 515–35; and Paulina Sliwa,
“Understanding and Knowing,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2015): 57–74.
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Ais evil. She argues: “After all, you believe that he was evil because he killed
millions of people, and that is correct, and you have—let us assume—the
ability to draw the conclusion that he was evil from the reasons why he
was evil and to do the same in similar cases. So it seems that you can have
moral understanding why p without having knowledge why p.”12
But there are good reasons for rejecting the crucial premise: that
if you form a true belief why p by exercising the capacity of moral under-
standing, you thereby understand why p. If this principle were true, we
should expect it to generalize to other epistemic faculties. But it does
not generalize. For example, forming a true belief that p based on exer-
cising one’s visual perception does not guarantee that one sees that p.
Suppose that Mary forms a belief that there is a red apple in front of her,
based on her visual perception. But the object in front of her is an apple-
shaped box, rather than a real apple. As it happens, however, there is, hid-
den fromMary’s view, a red apple inside the box.Mary’s belief is true. She
arrived at it by exercising her perceptual capacities. But it doesn’t follow
that she thereby sees a red apple or that she sees that there is a red apple
in front of her.13
In the same way, we can say that the agent has exercised her capacity
of moral understanding and that she has thereby acquired a true belief
about Stalin, while denying that this true belief is an instance of moral
understanding. The reductionist can grant that we are inclined to intu-
itively attribute moral understanding to the agent. But, she argues, this
attribution concerns her capacity for moral understanding. After all, we
have seen this capacity on display: she has arrived at the conclusion that
Stalin is evil by correctly responding to the evidence at hand.14 Hills’s ep-
istemic luck case then does not give us reason to dismiss reductionism.
Linguistic Data
There are positive reasons for accepting the reductionist claim that achieve-
ments of understanding require knowledge, based on linguistic consider-12. Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Knowledge,” 104.
13. If you are worried about deviant causal chains, a fake barn case will do as well.
Agents obliviously driving through fake barn country and chancing upon a real barn
may form a true belief that there is a barn in front of them, exercising their perceptual ca-
pacities. But it does not follow that they see that there is a barn there. Thanks to Stephen
Grimm for pressing me on this point.
14. Hills, “Understanding Why,” gives an additional argument against knowing why p
being necessary for understanding why p, by arguing that knowledge but not understand-
ing is defeasible. The reductionist can respond using the same strategy as in cases of epi-
stemic luck: what accounts for our intuitions that agents retain understanding in the face
of epistemic defeat is that we, rightly, credit them with the capacity of understanding.
Whether knowledge really is defeasible is controversial; see Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, “Unrea-
sonable Knowledge,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 1–21, and “Higher-Order Evidence
and the Limits of Defeat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2014): 314–45.
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Aations.15 These are relevant because nonreductionists do not purport to
be stipulating a novel theoretical concept of “understanding.” Rather, they
profess to pick up on amental state that plays a pervasive and important role
in our folk epistemic practice.
But if our folk epistemic practice recognizes a notion of understand-
ing that’s distinct from knowledge, we would expect this to be reflected in
the semantics of “knowing” and “understanding.” In particular, we would
expect to be able to attribute one but not the other to an agent. But con-
sider the following sentence:1
Know
ll use I understand why Stalin was evil, and I don’t know why Stalin was
evil.This sounds infelicitous. Third-personal cases sound just as strange. Con-
sider:Jane understands why she ought to give to charity, and she does not
know why she ought to give to charity.The phenomenon generalizes to other forms of understanding. Under-
standing, like knowledge, takes that, how, andwh-clauses. Thus, consider:Steve understands what the right thing to do is, and he does not
know what the right thing to do is.
Hye-Sun understands how to do what’s right, and she does not
know how to do what’s right.
Fatma understands when stepping in is the right thing to do, and
she does not know when stepping in is the right thing to do.
Rahel understands that she ought to give to charity, and she does
not know that she ought to give to charity.These all sound infelicitous, with the last one particularly jarring. The
reductionist can readily explain this: since understanding entails know-
ing, these sentences are contradictory. They are semantically defective.
The nonreductionist on the other hand owes us an explanation for the
linguistic data.
Could the nonreductionist simply argue that she does not share
these linguistic intuitions? This is not a promising response since evi-
dence suggests that among competent native speakers they are widely
shared. In a series of recent papers, Wilkenfeld, Plunkett, and Lombrozo5. My argument here builds on my previous work in Sliwa, “Understanding and
ing.”
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Aargue that folk attributions of understanding systematically track attri-
butions of knowledge. Summarizing their empirical studies on epistemic
luck in particular, they report that there is “no evidence that people are
more willing to attribute understanding than knowledge in cases involv-
ing epistemic luck.”16 The nonreductionist owes us an explanation of why
this is so.
Perhaps the nonreductionist could grant that the sentences are odd
but offer an alternative diagnosis. She might suggest that we should ex-
plain their oddity by appealing to pragmatic factors. Hills herself follows
this route: “that does sound odd, as does any sentence of the form: you
understand why p but you do not know why p. . . . Is this a serious objec-
tion to my interpretation of these cases and ultimately to my account of
understanding? It would be if the sentence were completely incoher-
ent. But I think that it is merely an unusual thing to hear.”17 But the mere
fact that a sentence is unusual cannot explain why it sounds odd. Most
unusual sentences, while perhaps surprising, do not sound odd at all.
(“The queen wears a hat made of pickles.”) A better explanation may
go by way of conversational implicature. The nonreductionist could sug-
gest that understanding does not semantically entail knowing but that
to attribute an instance of understanding is to pragmatically imply that
the other party knows. The mechanism here is presumably the same as
in the case of sentences like “I ate some of the cookies”: this implies that
there are some cookies left, but it is, strictly speaking, compatible with
my having emptied the cookie jar.
Again it’s hard to see how this will help the nonreductionist. Prag-
matic implicature can be cancelled by explicitly denying what is stan-
dardly implied. Just as there is nothing odd about my saying “I ate some
of the cookies. In fact, I ate all of them,”wewould expect there to be noth-
ing odd about asserting “John understands why killing is wrong, but he
does not know why killing is wrong.”
IV. IS KNOWLEDGE ALL THERE IS TO UNDERSTANDING?
Many nonreductionists accept that knowledge is necessary for instances
of understanding.18 They contest the thought that knowing is all there is
to understanding.16. Daniel Wilkenfeld, Dillon Plunkett, and Tania Lombrozo, “Folk Attributions of
Understanding: Is There a Role for Epistemic Luck?” Episteme (forthcoming), 2. See also
their “Depth and Deference: When and Why We Attribute Understanding,” Philosophical
Studies 173 (2016): 373–93.
17. Hills, “Understanding Why,” 677.
18. See, e.g., Stephen Grimm, “Understanding as Knowledge of Causes,” in Virtue
Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, ed. Abrol
Fairweather (London: Springer, 2014), 329–46.
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ABefore I get on to the arguments, one important clarification is in
order. Nonreductionists often present their arguments as counterexam-
ples to the claim that knowing why p is sufficient for understanding why






ll use An agent understands why p if and only if she knows why p.But reductionists need not accept this principle.19 What reductionists are
committed to, first and foremost, is that every instance of understanding
is constituted by knowledge. This is not to dismiss the nonreductionist
arguments. They present the reductionist with three substantive chal-
lenges: to explain the relationship between instances of understanding
and testimony; to explain how, on the reductionist picture, instances of
understanding can come in degrees; and to explain why we often attrib-
ute to others knowledge without understanding.
The reductionism I defend here says that whether agents have
achieved understanding why p depends both on whether they know why
p and on howmuch they know about why p:An agent understands why p if and only if she has a sufficient amount
of knowledge why p.I suggest that we should take amounts of knowledge to be a matter of
which epistemic possibilities the agent recognizes. And I argue that how
much knowledge is sufficient for an instance of understanding depends
on context. I argue that the reductionist account of understandingmeets
each of the challenges. This puts it at an advantage vis-à-vis the nonreduc-
tionist, since the burden of proof generally lies on thosewhowish tomake
substantive additions to our ontology.
Hills’s Argument from Moral Testimony
Hills argues that an agent who comes to know why an action is wrong by
relying on testimony will generally lack understanding why the action is
wrong: “If you are attempting to gain knowledge, testimony can serve as
the justification for your own belief but it is not usually a good way of ac-
quiring moral understanding. Understanding why p will not—cannot—
have the same relationship with testimony as knowing why p.”20 Hills
appeals to the case of Eleanor and Mary. Mary, who has thought about9. Although some do, e.g., Amber Riaz, “Moral Understanding and Knowledge,”
ophical Studies 172 (2015): 113–28, as well as an earlier time slice of myself in Sliwa,
erstanding and Knowing.”
0. Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” 121. A similar objection is widely
in the literature on understanding. See, e.g., Pritchard, Knowledge, Understanding and Ep-
Value; Kvanvig,Value of Knowledge ; or Elgin, “True Enough.”
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Avegetarianism a lot and understands why it’s morally required, tells El-
eanor that it’s wrong to eat meat because modern animal farming is cruel.
Eleanor accepts what Mary says. Hills argues that while Eleanor has thereby
gained testimonial knowledge why eating meat is wrong, there is never-
theless an epistemic asymmetry between Eleanor and Mary. The challenge
for the reductionist is to explain this asymmetry.
Hills suggests that the best explanation for this persistent epistemic
asymmetry is a difference in mental states: Mary understands why eat-
ing meat is wrong (she “grasps” the relevant proposition), while Eleanor
merely knows why it’s wrong (she “assents” to the proposition). Hills ar-
gues: “If this is correct [i.e., eating animals is indeed wrong because of
the cruelty of modern farming] and Eleanor believes her [Mary], she
knows not just that eating animals is wrong but she knows why too.
But she is still not in the same position as Mary. Eleanor cannot draw rel-
evant distinctions, cannot come to correct conclusions about similar
cases. (What about animals reared under better conditions? What about
fish?) Eleanor has been told why eating meat is wrong, but she does not
really grasp the reasons why it is wrong.”21 Hills is right that, plausibly,
Mary’s moral testimony notwithstanding, Eleanor and Mary are not ep-
istemically on a par. But this asymmetry is something that the reduction-
ist can both accommodate and explain.
The reductionist argues that we can account for the difference be-
tween Mary and Eleanor in terms of how much they know. Eleanor may
well know that eating animals is wrong because of the cruelty of animal
farming. But there is plausibly much that she does not know. For exam-
ple, she may not know why it is cruel. Such knowledge requires some fa-
miliarity with how animals are kept and slaughtered. But Eleanor knows
very little about these things. Mary, in contrast, has researched the issue
extensively. And so, she plausibly knows not only that it’s cruel but also
why and how it’s cruel.
According to the reductionist then, the difference between Eleanor
and Mary is not a difference in the kind of cognitive attitudes that they
bear to some fixed content—with Mary “grasping” and Eleanor “assent-
ing” to it. Rather Mary and Eleanor differ in what they know. They are
in the same mental state—knowledge—with respect to different con-
tents. What Eleanor needs to achieve epistemic parity with Mary is more
knowledge.
But, the nonreductionists may object, if all that is needed is more
knowledge, can’t this be had by more testimony? Given enough expert
testimony, you will eventually know what the expert knows. Nevertheless,
nonreductionists argue, there may still be an epistemic asymmetry be-
tween you and the expert. Thus, Grimm argues:21. Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” 100.
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All use In reply, it might be said that this attitude of grasping [i.e., under-
standing] is nothing significantly different from an act of assent: it
just involves more assent [i.e., more knowledge]. But it seems clear
that one can pile up assents as high as you like without getting a
grasping. . . . I can be told that the key to the proof lies in the fact
that the first element is divisible by the second, and I can assent to
this (again, based on the testimony of someone I trust). But I still
might not understand the proof; I might fail to see or grasp how
the truth of the theorem depends on the fact that the first element
is divisible by the second. And it seems like this game could go on
indefinitely. Youmight continue to spell out how the various depen-
dencies are supposed to work. Moreover, based on your testimony
I might assent to these claims at every step of the way. But none
of these assents, in and of themselves, adds up to a genuine grasp-
ing on my part. A new kind of cognitive achievement seems to be
needed.22This objection overestimates how easy it is to transmit knowledge by tes-
timony. It relies on the thought that whenever the epistemic difference
between two agents is a matter of what they know, this difference can be
overcome by testimony. But this assumption faces multiple challenges.
First, to testify you have to put your knowledge into words. But the
fact that the expert knows that p does not guarantee that she will be able
to articulate her knowledge, that is, that she will be able to express it in a
sentence whose meaning captures exactly what she knows. The worry
here is not simply that people differ in how articulate they are. It’s that
what we can communicate is systematically constrained by our language.
And at times the tools available in our language are blunt instruments
when compared to the nuance of what we know. Thus, the art historian
may know that a painter used a very particular shade of blue—she can pic-
ture it in her mind, she immediately recognizes it when she sees it—but
our language may lack the precise term for it. The best she can do is to
describe it (“it’s very intense and brilliant, with just a touch of green,
but not too much . . .”). But no matter how lengthy, the description will
be unlikely to exactly nail down the shade in question. This difficulty
arises in the case of moral knowledge, too. Think about a victim of stalk-
ing before the term entered common usage in the early 1990s. The vic-
tim may herself know quite well that and how she is being wronged; nev-
ertheless, she may not be able to fully convey the nature of the wrong to
others.232. Grimm, “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?” 532. Thank you to an anon-
s reviewer for drawing my attention to this objection.
3. The phenomenon I have in mind here has important similarities to what Miranda
r calls hermeneutical injustice. See her Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Know-
ew York: Oxford, 2007).
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AEven setting these difficulties aside, it’s not true that by “assenting”
to what the expert tells you, you always come to know what the expert
knows. Assent is cheap; I can assent to what I have been told by simply
believing that you spoke truly. But I can believe you spoke truly—that
the sentences you have uttered express a truth—even if I don’t know
what you said: I don’t know which truth you are expressing. What I can
come to know based on your testimony depends on many factors. It de-
pends, in part, on my linguistic and conceptual resources. But it also de-
pends on how much I already know about the subject matter at hand.
To see this, we need a better grip on what it is to have more or less
knowledge than someone else. A natural first answer is this: knowing
more is a matter of knowing a greater number of propositions. Elgin ar-
gues: “A subject’s knowledge consists of discrete grains, each separately
secured. She amasses more knowledge by accumulating more grains.”24
Those “grains” are “individual facts, expressed in true propositions and/
or stated in true declarative sentences.”25 They can be individually trans-
mitted in testimony. If you accept what I say, you acquire the “grain.” And
so it goes, “grain by grain” until eventually we know all the same things.
We see this conception at work in Grimm’s quote above: coming to know
more about the mathematical proof just is coming to assent to a greater
number of claims.
But this is not a plausible conception of what different amounts of
knowledge consist in. To get a sense of the difficulties, considerhowmany
“grains” someone acquires when learning that it was a dark and stormy
night. One? Or three? (“it was dark,” “it was stormy,” “it was night”).
But that person also learns that it was not a light and sunny day. Do these
count separately? Trying to determine how much someone knows by
counting sentences or “bits” of content is a nonstarter. Content does
not come precarved into individual discrete bits.26
A more promising approach starts from the observation that know-
ing that things are thus and so involves knowing that they aren’t other-24. Catherine Elgin, “From Knowledge to Understanding,” in Epistemology Futures,
ed. Stephen Hetherington (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 199–215, 203. See
also Georgi Gardiner, “Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value,” Acta Analytica 27
(2012): 163–81. It’s worth pointing out that the assumption has proponents outside
nonreductionism.
25. Elgin, “From Knowledge to Understanding,” 203.
26. This line of argument is developed in much more detail in Nick Treanor, “The
Measure of Knowledge,” Noûs 47 (2013): 577–601, and “Trivial Truths and the Aim of In-
quiry,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2014): 552–59. The point has also been
raised by Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 64–65; Daniel Den-
nett, Content and Consciousness (New York: Routledge, 1969), 183; Michael Williams,
Problems of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 131; and David Lewis, “Re-
duction of Mind,” in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 2:292–324, 311, among many others.
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Awise. To know that p is to discriminate among various ways the world
might be and to correctly locate the actual world on the right side of
the divide.27 I suggest that howmuch agents know is a matter of which ep-
istemic possibilities they recognize and exclude.
To illustrate, recall Mary and Eleanor. Both know that eating ani-
mals is wrong because modern animal farming is cruel. But the episte-
mic possibilities among which Mary discriminates are much more fine
grained than those of Eleanor. Knowing what animal farming looks like
and what animals need, Mary realizes that it can be cruel to animals in
different ways: their stalls may be crowded and filthy, their natural move-
ment constrained; their diet may be inappropriate; they may be sepa-
rated from their young. Animals may suffer on the way to slaughter, and
they may be terrified or killed in a painful way. Animal farming may also
be cruel to the workers in the industry. It may pollute the environment
and affect wildlife. Mary recognizes these as different ways in which ani-
mal farming could be cruel, and she knows which ones obtain.
Eleanor has some idea of what cruelty involves; she recognizes that
the animalsmay be in pain or frightened orhungry. On the basis ofMary’s
testimony, Eleanor knows that one of these obtains, but not which one.
But she cannot conceive of more specific possibilities. And insofar as she
has some misconceptions of what animal farming looks like, she may also
entertain some possibilities that Mary does not entertain.28
Eleanor and Mary both know that animal farming is cruel not be-
cause they have some “grain” in commonbut rather because there is over-
lap between the epistemic possibilities they recognize for what animal
farming could be like. But they differ in what exactly they know: Eleanor’s
range is more limited, less fine grained in some ways and perhaps more
inclusive in others.
This is, of course, just a sketch. Developing these remarks into a full
account of how to quantify knowledge would lead us too far away from
the topic at hand.29 But this outline is enough to make clear why we
should not expect testimony to be a panacea for epistemic asymmetries.
What a hearer can learn from a testimonial exchange depends as much
on the hearer as on the speaker; it depends on which epistemic possibil-
ities the hearer recognizes.27. This observation is found in, among others, Stalnaker, Inquiry; and David Lewis,
“Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549–67.
28. More knowledge is thus not simply a matter of recognizing more epistemic possi-
bilities. Sometimes it can be a matter of recognizing fewer. You distinguish between the
possibilities that either Clark Kent or Superman saved the child. I am in on Superman’s
secret, so I don’t.
29. The central idea here is similar to Treanor’s account in “Measure of Knowledge.”
Treanor develops this proposal in more detail, suggesting that we can use a similarity rela-
tion to quantify knowledge.
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ATo illustrate, suppose that Jones (who has nomedical expertise) and
Smith (a medical doctor) are talking about a recently deceased friend
and wonder why he died. A mutual acquaintance who, like Smith, is a
medical doctor informs them that it was lung cancer: “Small cell car-
cinoma. Nasty stuff.” Jones and Smith get the same testimony. Both ac-
cept the doctor’s words; they believe him.
Yet, they plausibly differ in what they have come to know because
they differ in which epistemic possibilities the testimony allows them
to exclude. Jones comes to exclude the possibilities that his friend died
from a car crash, a heart attack, and cancers of various other body parts.
Smith eliminates some of the same possibilities—the car crash, the brain
tumor, the heart attack—as well as that it was large cell lung cancer and
mixed cell carcinoma. Jones cannot entertain these because she lacks
both the relevant conceptual resources and medical background knowl-
edge. While both Jones and Smith believe what the speaker tells them
and accept her words, they nevertheless differ in what they come to know
on the basis of the testimony.
This should not be surprising. Giving and taking testimony falls
under the general category of giving and accepting assertions. And it’s
familiar that the effects of any particular assertion depend on what both
speaker and hearer bring to the table. Thus, as Stalnaker argues: “the es-
sential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the par-
ticipants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to
what is presupposed.”30 The presuppositions are the epistemic possibili-
ties that the participants of the conversation entertain—the ways the
world might be, according to those agents. When there is a significant
asymmetry in expertise, the presuppositions of speaker and hearer will
generally not align: the expert can discriminate among ways the world
might be that the layperson is oblivious to, and the layperson may dis-
criminate among possibilities that the expert recognizes as one and the
same. And since, for example, one cannot eliminate a possibility that
one cannot entertain, the hearer will generally not come to have the same
knowledge as the speaker. Insofar as she accepts the speaker’s words, the
hearer will learn something. But she will learn only part (and perhaps only
a small part) of what the speaker said. In the extreme case, the hearer may
only learn that the sentence uttered by the expert expresses a truth, while
remaining entirely ignorant of which truth it expresses.
The reductionist thus agrees that, when there is a significant episte-
mic asymmetry between two parties, transmitting instances of under-30. Robert Stalnaker, “Assertion,” in Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in
Speech and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 78–95, 85. We don’t have to
rely on Stalnaker’s framework here; the same point can be made drawing on David Lewis,
“Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): 339–59.
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Astanding via testimony may not be easy. But she allows that in some cases
it is possible: by relying on enough testimony, we can sometimes come to
know what the expert knows, or at least, we can come to know enough to
achieve understanding. In some cases, it may take a lot of testimony—
too much for a single exchange. Thus, imagine Eleanor andMary having
many, many conversations about animal farming over the course of sev-
eral weeks. Eventually, Eleanor could learn enough fromMary to achieve
understanding of why eating meat is wrong. And by going to medical
school and listening to a few years’ worth of lectures in anything from
biochemistry to oncology, Jones’s medical knowledge might match that
of Smith’s. In others, the epistemic asymmetry might be insurmountable
by any finite amount of testimony.
Let me say more in defense of this last thought: that achieving an
instance of understanding through testimony is possible. For you might
suggest an alternative view: instances of moral understanding are in-
stances of moral knowledge based on moral inference. What is it for a
knowledge to be based on moral inference? A natural idea is that the
agent must have herself inferred that, say, the action is right from its
right-making features.31 For example, she must have inferred the moral
status of eating meat from facts about how animals are kept. On this
view, it’s not the quantity of knowledge that matters but its quality.
The knowledge needs to be of the right kind; it needs to be based on
a moral inference.32
But drawing the relevant inference yourself is neither necessary nor
sufficient for achieving an instance of understanding. To see that it’s not
sufficient, consider Yasmin, who is joining a group of animal rights activ-
ists. Members of this group believe that eating meat is wrong on the basis
of very extensive research into modern animal farming and slaughter
and animal well-being. Yasmin, too, believes that eating meat is wrong.
But her belief is based on a fragment of a documentary she once listened
to while driving. She’s hazy on the details, but she remembers it mention-
ing that modern animal farming was cruel to animals. From this, she in-
ferred that it’s morally wrong to eat animals. Since it’s the cruelty of an-
imal farming that makes eating meat wrong (we can suppose), Yasmin’s
belief is based on a moral inference. But, given her limited knowledge
when compared to the animal rights activists, we would not credit her
with an instance of moral understanding.31. The right-making features constitute what Enoch calls “transparent moral evi-
dence.” See David Enoch, “A Defense of Moral Deference,” Journal of Philosophy 111
(2014): 229–58 at 237. Note that I’m not taking any stand here on what this inference in-
volves: it could involve an episode of conscious reasoning, but it could also be a
subpersonal affair. I say a bit more about different accounts of moral reasoning in n. 44.
32. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative.
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AMore importantly, however, you do not need to draw the relevant in-
ference yourself to achieve moral understanding. Imagine Samir, who
faces a tricky situation. He just met his best friend’s new boyfriend. His
friend is completely infatuated with this guy. But after seeing them to-
gether, Samir cannot shake a bad feeling. He is uncertain how to answer
his friend’s inevitable question about his opinion. Samir recognizes the
various considerations that pull in different directions: his concern for
his friend’s well-being and their close friendship based on straight talk
on the one hand, the risk of hurting his friend’s feelings and endanger-
ing their friendship on the other. Samir sees the significance of each con-
sideration, but he is uncertain how to weigh them up. He turns to some-
onewhosemoral judgmenthe trustswho, rightly, tells himthat the reasons
to tell the truth ( John’s well-being, in particular) are weightier than those
to remain silent. It seems that, with this help, Samir comes to understand
both that he should tell the truth and why he should do so. But Samir’s
moral knowledge is not based on his ownmoral inference: it was precisely
the moral inference that he needed help with.
Cases like Yasmin and Samir suggest that when it comes to the rela-
tionship between moral knowledge and instances of understanding, it’s
quantity that matters more than quality. Yasmin doesn’t understand why
eating meat is wrong because, even though she drew the inference her-
self, she does not know enough about why it’s wrong. Samir does under-
stand why he should tell the truth because, even though he didn’t draw
the inference himself, he knows a lot about why he ought to tell the truth.
The observation that knowledge comes in different amounts helps
reductionism in other ways. First, it helps to address a long-standing chal-
lenge for the reductionist: how to make sense of the fact that achieve-
ments of understandings seem gradable when attributions of knowledge
are binary. The answer is that the degree to which an agent understands
why, for example, eatingmeat ismorally wrong corresponds to howmuch
she knows about why it’s wrong. The more you know about why eating
meat is wrong, the better you understand why it’s wrong.
Second, it helps the reductionist give a satisfying explanation for
the relationship between degrees of understanding and abilities. As Hills
notes, the epistemic difference between Eleanor and Mary will manifest
itself in what it is that they can do: which questions they can answer, what
they canexplain, and soon.UnlikeMary, “Eleanor cannotdraw relevantdis-
tinctions, cannot come to correct conclusions about similar cases. (What
about animals reared under better conditions? What about fish?)”33 Hills
suggests that, rather than taking this difference in abilities as something
to be explained, we should rather take it as constitutive of instances of33. Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” 100.
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Aunderstanding: what it is for agents to lack these abilities just is for them
to lack an instance of understanding.
In contrast, the reductionist can explain why agents in Eleanor and
Mary’s position differ in what they can do: they differ in what they can do
because they differ in what they know. Given that, compared to Mary,
there is much about animal farming that Eleanor does not know, it’s
not surprising that there aremany questions she cannot answer andmany
inferences she cannot draw. Eleanor lacks these abilities precisely because
she lacks the requisite knowledge.
Hills’s Linguistic Argument
Hills also appeals to linguistic considerations to argue against reduction-
ism. She argues that nonreductionism offers us a straightforward explana-
tion of two distinct phenomena. The first is that English is not unique in
having different words for “to understand” and “to know.” For example,
German distinguishes between “wissen” and “verstehen,” French between
“savoir” and “comprendre,” Finnish between “tietää” and “ymmärtää,” and
Polish between “wiedzieć” and “rozumieć.”34 The second is that there is
nothing odd about attributing an instance of knowledge to someone with-






ll use Eleanor knows why eating meat is wrong, but she doesn’t under-
stand why eating meat is wrong.This seems like a perfectly fine thing to say. Hills argues that the non-
reductionist has a ready explanation: it’s not surprising that languages
use different words to attribute instances of knowledge and instances
of understanding “because understanding why p and knowledge why p
are separate states that play different epistemic roles.”35 And so, it’s also
not surprising that it can be felicitous to attribute knowledge without at-
tributing understanding.
But the reductionist has a sound response to this challenge. The re-
ductionist says that instances of moral understanding are constituted by
moral knowledge. But not just any amount will do: you need to know a
sufficient amount. What counts as sufficient depends on the salient alter-
natives in that context: this may be other agents and how much they know.
Or it may be you at a different point in time—how much you knew or will
know then.364. Although this may not be universal. See Riaz, “Moral Understanding and Knowl-
”
5. Hills, “Understanding Why,” 669.
6. A contextualist account of the semantics of understanding has also been suggested
ristophKelp, “Understanding Phenomena,” Synthese 192 (2015): 3799–3816. Kelp’s con-
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AThis yields a contextualist semantics of understanding: the truth
conditions of a sentence ascribing understanding to an agent vary de-
pending on the context in which the sentence is used. “Understand-
ing” is, in this respect, similar to the term “empty.” We can truly say “this
drawer is empty” when the salient alternative is one that’s full of junk.
But the same sentence is false when uttered in a context in which the
salient alternative is a vacuum chamber. The context determines how lit-
tle stuff there must be in order for a container to count as empty. Simi-
larly, the context determines just how much knowledge an agent needs
to have in order to count as having an instance of understanding.37
Such contextualism straightforwardly accommodates the linguistic












ll use Eleanor knows why she should not eat meat but does not under-
stand why she should not eat meat.Can we explain why this sentence seems both assertable and true? We
can: it is true because the salient alternative here is Mary who is much
more knowledgeable than Eleanor. Mary’s epistemic situation sets the
standard for how much knowledge is required in order to count as hav-
ing an instance of understanding.
We can also explain why we use distinct words for “knowledge” and
“understanding.” The concept of understanding fulfills a socially useful
function because it’s useful to track how much knowledge individuals
have on particular questions. Such information is particularly valuable
when deciding whom you should turn to for testimony and advice. If
Mary knows a lot more about why eating animals is wrong than Eleanor
does, then she is very likely to know not just whether it’s cruel but also
what makes it cruel. Someone who has achieved understanding on a
question will in general be a better source of knowledge because there
is more knowledge that can be gained from her.38
This kind of contextualism is also independently attractive. First, it
explains why our attributions of understanding are sensitive to howmuch7. Note that this proposal is neutral on whether knowledge is itself a context-sensitive
as, e.g., argued by Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge.”
8. Similarly, Wilkenfeld, Plunkett, and Lombrozo, “Depth and Deference,” 374, ar-
at the difference in attributing instances of knowledge versus instances of under-
ing “is related to speakers’ interest in tracking who would be a valuable expert to con-
out a particular field of inquiry.” A principled way to develop this account would take
nd Craig’s discussion of the function of the concept of knowledge as its starting
. See Edmund Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
rd: Oxford University Press, 1990). I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising
hallenge.
owever is to give an account of understanding of phenomena (what I refer to as the ca-
of understanding), as opposed to individual instances of understanding.
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Asalient expertise there is in the background. Thus, it’s fine for me to claim
that I understand why smoking causes lung cancer at a dinner party with
my philosophy friends. But it seems less fine when I’m a layperson at a con-
vention of pulmonologists.
Second, contextualism explains why the following sentences seem
like good inferences:ll use If Eleanor knows why eating meat is wrong but doesn’t understand
why it’s wrong, then there is something that Eleanor does not know
about why it’s wrong to eat meat.
If Mary understands why eating meat is wrong but Eleanor does not,
then there is something that Mary knows about eating meat that Elea-
nor does not know.These are natural inferences to draw since to say that Mary, but not
Eleanor, has achieved understanding with respect to a question just is
to say that Mary knows more than Eleanor about it. But they present a
puzzle for nonreductionists, since agents can differ in what they under-
stand even when there is no difference in what they know. But then,
we should not be able to infer from a lack of understanding to a lack
of knowing.
Third, contextualism explains why, once you have attributed a very
large amount of knowledge to people on a particular question, there is
no need to also attribute understanding to them. Thus, while not contra-
dictory, the following statement sounds decidedly odd:Lucy has an impressive amount of knowledge about the extinction
of dinosaurs—she knows everything there is to know, way more than
any other scholar. And she also understands why dinosaurs became
extinct.This is unsurprising: to attribute an instance of understanding why dino-
saurs became extinct just is to attribute a large amount of knowledge
about this question to someone. Once you have done the latter, the out-
right attribution of understanding becomes superfluous; it violates the
Gricean maxim of relevance. But on nonreductionism it should be sur-
prising: since instances of knowing and instances of understanding are
distinct mental states that can and (as we have seen) often do come apart,
there is always the possibility of having the former without the latter.
Let’s step back for a moment and take stock. The last sections made
a case for taking knowledge to be necessary for instances of understand-
ing. This section responded to nonreductionist arguments that knowl-
edge cannot be all there is to instances of understanding. I have argued
for a reductionist account on which every instance of understanding isThis content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on April 12, 2017 04:07:50 AM
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Aconstituted by knowledge. But whether agents, for example, understand
why p depends not just on whether they know why p but also on how
much they know. I argued that such a reductionist has compelling expla-
nations of the allegedly problematic phenomena. These explanations are
not ad hoc; their central elements—what constitutes different amounts
of knowledge, how testimony transmits knowledge, a contextualist ac-
count of the semantics of understanding attributions—are all indepen-
dently plausible and well motivated. Reductionism thus gives us an ac-
count of instances of understanding that accommodates and explains
their central features and is, at the same time, parsimonious. Thus, we
should be reductionist about instances of moral understanding even if
we concede themoral reasoning claim—that the capacity ofmoral under-
standing is the capacity formoral reasoning. The next section turns to the
capacity of moral understanding and takes aim at this concession.V. MORAL UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT MORAL REASONING
According to the moral reasoning claim, the capacity of moral under-
standing is characterized by the abilities to follow moral explanations,
draw the right moral conclusions based on yourmoral evidence, and give
moral explanations yourself. This section argues that we should not ac-
cept the moral reasoning claim; it yields an implausibly narrow concep-
tion of the capacity of moral understanding. I will bring this out in two
ways. First, I argue that themoral reasoning claim conflates havingmoral
understanding and having the ability to articulate it. But these are dis-
tinct abilities, and they can come apart. Second, I argue that the moral
reasoning claim cannot accommodate the significance of first-personal
experience for moral understanding.
Consider Julie, who is, by all accounts, a morally good person: hon-
est, caring, and kind. She is also extremely morally competent; for any
moral situation she finds herself in, she does the right thing because it
strikes her as the right thing to do, and it strikes her as the right thing
to do because she responds to the morally relevant features of the situa-
tion. I think Julie would rightly strike us as someone who has deep moral
understanding. But Julie need not, also, have the abilities to give moral
explanations or provide an informative justification of her verdicts. She
may not be very good at drawing conclusions about abstract moral sce-
narios. When pressed for an explanation, she might just shrug her shoul-
ders and offer: “it’s just the right thing to do.” Or perhaps: “it would be
unkind not to help.” But she knows right and wrong when she sees it.
Julie’s predicament is just a more extreme version of a familiar situation;
we often reach moral verdicts without any reflection and cannot give
much of an explanation for why they are right. (Why is it wrong to drownThis content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on April 12, 2017 04:07:50 AM
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Ababies in Coca-Cola for fun? Why is it wrong to harm someone? Well, it
just is.)39
I have suggested that agents like Julie have the capacity of moral un-
derstanding even when they do not have the kinds of abilities that the
moral reasoning claim regards as essential for it. But youmight insist that,
while Julie does strike us asmorally admirable in someway, we should nev-
ertheless stop short of crediting her with the capacity for moral under-
standing. The problem is, youmight argue, that the capacity of moral un-
derstanding requires more of an agent than just being in a position to do
the right thing herself. Part of what it is to have this capacity is to be a
good moral advisor. But one can only give moral advice if one can artic-
ulate and explain one’s moral insight. To be a good moral advisor, Julie
thus needs to have the abilities outlined by the moral reasoning claim.40
There is something right about the general line of thought: some-
one who has great moral understanding (the capacity) is typically some-
one we can rely on for moral guidance. Moral understanding is not just
personally but interpersonally valuable. But Julie can be a excellent
source of moral guidance even when she lacks the abilities outlined by
the moral reasoning claim. First, moral guidance need not take the form
of verbal moral advice. We can learn not just from what others tell us but
also from what they show us. Even if Julie is no good at articulating moral
principles and explanations, she can show others what the right thing to
do is; she can show them how to be kind, caring, and honest and how to
resolve conflicting moral demands. In other words, she can offer her
friends moral guidance by being a moral exemplar—a role model. Her
friends can come to see what the right thing to do is in a situation by imag-
ining how Julie would handle it. Moral guidance is not the same thing as
verbal instruction.
Second, suppose you turn to Julie for help with how to deal with
a difficult and quarrelsome relative at an upcoming family reunion.
Should youmake a scene? Or should you let things go? Julie does not em-39. See Peter Railton, “The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale,” Ethics 124 (2014):
813–59. The suggestion that our capacity for understanding can outstrip our capacity to
articulate has been made in the context of other debates, particularly in discussions of
particularism. See, e.g., Paul Churchland, “The Neural Representation of the Social
World,” inMind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science, ed. Andy Clark et al. (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 91–108; Joseph Raz, “The Truth in Particularism,” in En-
gaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 218–46; Pekka Väyrynen, “Usable
Moral Principles,” in Challenging Moral Particularism, ed. Mark Norris Lance (New York:
Routledge, 2008), 75–106; and Larry Wright, “Reasons and the Deductive Ideal,” Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 197–206. I’mgrateful to an editor of this journal for pointing
me to this literature.
40. This argument is suggested by a discussion in Alison Hills, “The Intellectuals and
the Virtues,” Ethics 126 (2015): 7–36, at 28–29, where she argues that virtue requires the
ability to engage in moral reasoning.
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Abark on a lecture. Rather, she listens patiently to your story. Then she
asks a number of insightful questions about what you think you should
do, about your “problem relative,” about how conflicts typically unfold,
about who else will be present. She doesn’t offer much in terms of moral
explanations—she doesn’t even tell you outright what to do—but her
questions draw your attention to certain morally relevant features of
the situation that were not on your radar. You leave the conversation with
real moral insight: you know what you should do. You come to see that
there are other options to diffuse the provocation without causing other
family members needless distress.
Julie has provided you with something very much like moral advice
based on her capacity for moral understanding. She resolved your un-
certainty about both what the right thing to do is and why it’s the right
thing to do. But doing so did not require Julie to articulate any moral
explanations or to draw moral conclusions about related cases. The abil-
ities involved in the moral reasoning claim are hence not necessary for
moral guidance.
Such cases bring out that there is a difference between having the
capacity of moral understanding and, for example, the ability to articu-
late moral explanations. An agent can have the former without having
the latter.41 Of course, someone’s being very good at giving moral ex-
planations and reasoning through cases can be excellent evidence for
her capacity of moral understanding. But it does not constitute this ca-
pacity.42
There is a second way in which the moral reasoning claim falls short
as an account of the capacity of moral understanding: it cannot account
for the significance of first-personal experience. Having a certain experi-
ence—witnessing a morally significant situation firsthand—can expand
one’s capacity of moral understanding. It can also be the basis for achiev-
ing instances of moral understanding. Thus, consider George Orwell’s









ll use It was about forty yards to the gallows. I watched the bare brown
back of the prisoner marching in front of me. He walked clumsily
with his bound arms, but quite steadily, with that bobbing gait of1. Conversely, one can have the abilities involved in the moral reasoning claim while
g a very limited capacity of moral understanding. One does not have to look far for
fe examples: philosophers, excellent at reasoning about even complicated moral cases
ing fairness and equality and yet blind when it comes to instances of, e.g., gender inequal-
t under their noses.
2. Stephen Grimm also puts pressure on an articulacy requirement on understand-
ointing to cases of young children. See his “Understanding and Transparency,” in Ex-
ng Understanding: New Essays in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, ed. Stephen
,ChristophBaumberger, andSabineAmmon(NewYork:Routledge, 2017), chap. 10.
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All use the Indian who never straightens his knees. At each step his muscles
slid neatly into place, the lock of hair on his scalp danced up and
down, his feet printed themselves on the wet gravel. And once, in
spite of the men who gripped him by each shoulder, he stepped
slightly aside to avoid a puddle on the path.
It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it
means to destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner
step aside to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable
wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man
was not dying, he was alive just as we were alive. All the organs of
his body were working—bowels digesting food, skin renewing itself,
nails growing, tissues forming—all toiling away in solemn foolery.
His nails would still be growing when he stood on the drop, when
he was falling through the air with a tenth of a second to live. His
eyes saw the yellow gravel and the grey walls, and his brain still re-
membered, foresaw, reasoned—reasoned even about puddles. He
and we were a party of men walking together, seeing, hearing, feel-
ing, understanding the same world; and in two minutes, with a sud-
den snap, one of us would be gone—onemind less, one world less.43It is natural to say that witnessing the execution led Orwell to under-
stand that capital punishment is morally wrong and why it’s wrong—or
to understand it better. It is also natural to say that it expanded his capac-
ity of moral understanding. But the moral reasoning claim conflicts with
both of these things.
It conflicts with the former because it implies that agents can
achieve instances of moral understanding only by engaging in moral rea-
soning (e.g., by drawing moral conclusions based on the relevant infor-
mation, by articulating moral explanations). This is because we achieve
instances of moral understanding by exercising our capacity of moral un-
derstanding. According to the moral reasoning claim, this capacity just
is the capacity to engage in moral reasoning. But Orwell’s moral insight
is not based on moral deliberation. He didn’t reason his way to the con-
clusion that the death penalty is morally wrong.44 Rather, it is based on3. George Orwell, “A Hanging in Burma," in Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of
Orwell (London: Penguin, 1970), 1:66–71, at 69.
4. But didn’t this involve something like moral reasoning? Some philosophers (e.g.,
Wedgwood, “The Normative Force of Reasoning,” Noûs 40 [2006]: 660–86; Nomy
y,Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will [Princeton, NJ: Princeton
rsity Press, 2006]; Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, “Deliberation and Acting
asons,” Philosophical Review 121 [2012]: 209–39) argue that reasoning can be merely
ter of causal transitions between mental states, which need not be mediated by con-
or deliberate mental actions; it’s not so much something we do as something we un-
. I don’t deny that Orwell underwent moral reasoning in this sense—after all, he
d a belief that killing the man was wrong based on his perception that it was wrong.
ccount of the capacity of moral understanding defended in the next section—the
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Asomething more like a perceptual experience. He saw “the unspeakable
wrongness” of killing another human being.
Orwell’s experience may also have expanded his capacity of moral
understanding. After all, certain experiences can improve one’s episte-
mic position vis-à-vis a particular moral subject matter. But plausibly in-
sofar as they broaden one’s capacity of moral understanding, it’s not be-
cause they make one better at moral reasoning. A disabled person may
have a better understanding of ableism than an able-bodied person be-
cause of her experience of being disabled. But her deeper moral under-
standing need not be a matter of giving moral explanations. Rather, it
may be a matter of being able to recognize ableism when one sees it, of
giving certain considerations the moral weight they deserve, of noticing
particular injustices. Similarly, working in a particularly hostile environ-
ment may lead a woman to have a better understanding of sexual harass-
ment. But her increased capacity of moral understanding need not in-
volve being better at drawing conclusions about cases. Rather, she may
simply be in a better position to recognize sexual harassment both when
she is on the receiving end of it and when others are, to notice little ineq-
uities that may have otherwise escaped her attention and give them the
correct moral weight. Her experience makes things salient to her that
may not have been salient to her before.
The two lines of objection both point to one underlying problem
with the moral reasoning claim: it offers a much too narrow conception
of the capacity of moral understanding. Agents can expand and deepen
their capacity of moral understanding with respect to specific moral
questions even when they do not improve their abilities to “follow ex-
planations why p” or “give explanations why p in their own words.” And
they can achieve instances of moral understanding without exercising
their capacity for moral reasoning. This is not to say that the ability to en-
gage inmoral reasoning is irrelevant to the capacity of moral understand-
ing—it’s just to say that the capacity of moral understanding includes
much more than that.
Let’s pause for a moment and review the argument so far. I started
out with Alison Hills’s account of moral understanding. I have argued
that her account is characterized by two commitments: nonreductionism,
a view about the nature of those mental states that comprise instances
of moral understanding, and the moral reasoning claim, an account ofMoral Knowledge Account—is compatible with the thought that moral understanding in-
volves reasoning in this minimal sense. But those sympathetic to the moral reasoning claim
(e.g., Alison Hills, Michael Strevens, Jonathan Kvanvig) explicitly take the capacity of un-
derstanding to involve abilities that constitute reasoning in a much more robust sense, on
the personal rather than the subpersonal level. My argument here targets these views.
Thanks to Stephen Grimm and an anonymous referee for asking me to clarify this point.
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Athe capacity of moral understanding. I have argued that these commit-
ments are distinct and independent and that there are persuasive rea-
sons to reject them both. These negative conclusions prepare the ground
for the positive project of the article. The next section develops an ac-
count of the capacity of moral understanding that incorporates the two
lessons drawn out so far: the lesson that instances ofmoral understanding
reduce to instances of moral knowledge and the lesson that there is more
to the capacity of moral understanding than a set of abilities related to
moral reflection.
VI. MORAL UNDERSTANDING AS KNOWING
RIGHT FROM WRONG
I suggest that the capacity of moral understanding is the ability to acquire
moral knowledge. The ability to acquire moral knowledge is constitutive
of moral understanding. So, an agent has moral understanding if and only
if (and to the degree to which) she has the ability to acquire moral knowl-
edge. I will call this the Moral Knowledge Account.
Let me start by unpacking its central elements. Following William-
son and others, I assume that knowledge is a mental state.45 It is a per-
sonal rather than a subpersonal state. This means that the agent must
have some first-personal access to its content; it must be available to guide
the agent’s actions. Moral knowledge is knowledge with a particular con-
tent; it employs moral concepts. Examples of moral knowledge include
knowing that an action is right or wrong, just, fair, sexist, racist, or kind;
knowing what the right (wrong, just, fair, sexist, etc.) thing to do is; know-
ing why an action is right (or wrong, just, fair, sexist, etc.); and so on.46
To have the ability to acquire moral knowledge, the agent needs to
have a psychological mechanism (or plausibly, a set of psychological
mechanisms) which, if it works correctly, yields moral knowledge when
the agent is in the right circumstances—in particular, when she is pre-
sented with the relevant moral evidence.47 An ability to acquire moral
knowledge thus necessarily involves an ability to respond to moral evi-45. See Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), esp. chap. 1. For arguments in support of this claim, see also John Gibbons,
“Knowledge in Action,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 579–600; and
Jennifer Nagel, “Knowledge as a Mental State,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013):
275–310.
46. While I’m sympathetic to intellectualist views of knowledge how and knowledge-
wh, the Moral Knowledge Account is neutral on the question.
47. Recall that on the notion of ability at issue here, I do not have an ability to, say,
speak French merely because I could, in principle, learn to speak French, were I to enroll
in a French class. To have the ability, I, in fact, need to have the relevant psychological
mechanism that responds to French utterances.
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Adence.48 The capacity of moral understanding is, on this account, analo-
gous to other epistemic capacities, such as perceptual capacities, for ex-
ample, the capacity for color vision. One way to characterize this capacity
is as the ability to achieve color knowledge via vision when presented
with colored objects in various viewing conditions.49 Similarly, we can
characterize the capacity of perfect pitch as the ability to identify (i.e.,
know) which pitch is being played when the agent is aurally presented
with a sound. Like these two,moral understanding is a capacity to achieve
knowledge when presented with the right evidence. But unlike color vi-
sion or perfect pitch, the capacity of moral understanding is not tied to
a particular sense modality.
The Moral Knowledge Account tells us what the capacity of moral
understanding consists in. But it also entails reductionism about in-
stances of moral understanding. This is because we achieve instances of
moral understanding by successfully exercising our capacity of moral un-
derstanding. If the capacity of moral understanding is the capacity to ac-
quire moral knowledge, then successfully exercising this capacity results
in achieving moral knowledge. As there are compelling independent
reasons to accept reductionism, this is a strength of theMoral Knowledge
Account.
We have an initial sketch of the Moral Knowledge Account on the
table. I will now draw some comparisons between it and the moral rea-
soning claim, with an eye toward both filling out its details and highlight-
ing its advantages.
In contrast to the moral reasoning claim, the Moral Knowledge Ac-
count allows for many ways in which an agent can achieve instances of
moral understanding because there are many ways in which we can achieve
moral knowledge. One such way is moral reasoning. In some situations,
there may be no way around moral reasoning to gain moral knowledge,
for example, when you face a novel moral scenario, requiring you to
weigh difficult factual and conflicting moral considerations. How many
refugees should a community accept? Should we allow parents to freely
choose schools for their children? Should we give the sole available dose
of a hitherto untested Ebola drug to an American who contracted the
disease while volunteering or to the local doctor? These are difficult moral48. Moral understanding is thus, broadly speaking, a discriminatory ability: an ability
to discriminate right from wrong. See Timothy Williamson, Identity and Discrimination (Ox-
ford: Blackwell-Wiley, 2013), chap. 1. What exactly moral evidence consists in is an impor-
tant question that unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this article. But I am sympathetic
to a view on which moral evidence consists of both moral and nonmoral facts. See Kieran
Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), for a view along
these lines.
49. See Will Davies, “Colour Vision and Seeing Colours,” British Journal for the Philoso-
phy of Science (forthcoming).
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Aquestions, and insofar as we can achieve moral knowledge about what
the right thing to do is, it’s only by carefully reflecting on the various op-
tions. Thus, having the ability to engage in moral reasoning will be part
of one’s capacity of moral understanding.
The Moral Knowledge Account thus accommodates an important
insight of the moral reasoning claim: being bad at moral reflection can
seriously limit one’s capacity of moral understanding. Being an incompe-
tent moral reasoner generally makes one vulnerable to moral mistakes
when it comes to situations in which we have to make complex moral de-
cisions. Such a limitation is not inevitable, however. An agent may com-
pensate for her impaired moral reasoning by, for example, being partic-
ularly affectively attuned to morally relevant features of the situation.
And, conversely, an agent with impaired affective responsesmay compen-
sate for this by developing her capacity for moral reasoning.50
The Moral Knowledge Account is pluralist—it allows that the capac-
ity of moral understanding can be multiply realized. Plausibly there are
many distinct faculties and cognitive mechanisms by which we acquire
moral knowledge: perception, imagination, intuition, our affective re-
sponses, and moral reasoning can all be sources of moral knowledge.
On theMoral Knowledge Account then, moral understanding is realized
by a set of different faculties and cognitive abilities. Agents can have these
cognitive abilities to different degrees. And so, what exactly grounds the
capacity of moral understanding may vary from agent to agent.
The Moral Knowledge Account explains why first-personal experi-
ence is important to moral understanding. We often say that only by see-
ing something firsthand is how “we really got it” or “it finally clicked.”
What is it that firsthand experience gets us? Actions are right and wrong
in virtue of their features. To understand why an action is wrong gener-
ally requires you to know what (some of) its wrong-making features are.
First-personal experience gives you a richer conception of what those
are. Contrast being told that a patch of color is red with looking at it.
In both cases you may come to know that it’s red. But in the latter case
you learn a lot more: you learn that it’s red by seeing its precise shade.
Similarly, compare being told that prisons are dehumanizing with visit-
ing a prison yourself. In the latter case, you learn a lot more: you come
to know that it’s dehumanizing by seeing the myriad ways—big and
small—in which prisoners are dehumanized. Of course, you can learn
more detail by seeking out more detailed testimony. But, setting aside
that we may lack words to express some of what we see, even the most
detailed testimonial account cannot rival the richness of the content of50. Jeannette Kennett, “Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency,” Philosophical Quarterly
52, 208 (2002): 340–57, discusses this specifically in the context of agents with Asperger’s
syndrome, arguing that such agents can achieve a high degree of moral reliability by engag-
ing in explicit and conscious moral reasoning.
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Aour own perception. We can see this play out in Orwell’s case. He sees “the
mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full
tide” by seeing the very particular things that cutting a life short was:
someone whose “eyes saw the yellow gravel and the grey walls, and his
brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned—reasoned even about puddles”
would cease to be.
Second, certain first-personal experiences may be essential to gain
epistemic access to certain wrong-making features because these include
facts about how the action affects the wronged party: what being the vic-
tim of this wrong is like. It’s plausible that you cannot fully appreciate some
important aspects of the relevant experience—the shame of a survivor of
sexual assault or the isolation experienced by a victim of domestic vio-
lence—unless you have undergone a similar experience.51
First-personal experiences may not just help us to achieve particular
instances of moral understanding—they can also broaden our capacity
of moral understanding. Again, on the Moral Knowledge Account, this
is not surprising. According to Lewis, by having a particular first-personal
experience: “you gain abilities to remember and to imagine. After you
taste Vegemite, and you learn what it’s like, you can afterward remember
the experience you had. By remembering how it once was, you can after-
ward imagine such an experience. Indeed, even if you eventually forget
the occasion itself, you will very likely retain your ability to imagine such
an experience. Further, you gain an ability to recognize the same expe-
rience if it comes again.”52 Plausibly, what goes for the taste of Vegemite
also goes for the (metaphorical) taste of injustice, violence, or poverty.
Someone who has experienced poverty knows more about economic in-
justice because she knows what it’s like to be on the receiving end of it.
Because of this, she can empathize with others in the same situation, she
can imagine what it’s like to be in their shoes, and she recognizes the tell-
tale signs of inequality. Someone who has experienced being the subject
of disparaging sexist comments knows what it’s like to be on the receiving
end of sexism. For this reason, she can put herself in the shoes of others
in similar circumstances; she remembers what it was like for her and she
can imagine what it’s like for them. These abilities may well make her
more sensitive to whether a given remark is inappropriate and more at-
tuned to the impact it has on others. Her experience thus expands her
moral understanding because it makes her more sensitive to a certain class
of moral evidence. It increases the range of circumstances for which she51. The emphasis here is on “fully.” Testimony from others and your own imagination
can, of course, take you a long way toward such knowledge.
52. David Lewis, “What Experience Teaches,” in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology,
2:260–90, at 286. Lewis argues that knowing what it’s like just is a matter of having these
abilities. But it’s plausible that we acquire such abilities by first-personal experience, even
if we do not think that they are all there is to knowing what it’s like.
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Ais in a position to know what the right thing to do is, and so, it broadens her
capacity to acquire moral knowledge.53 Her capacity for moral understand-
ing is expanded, even if she is not able to articulate her knowledge—even
if she cannot explain to someone else why a particular remark is off.
Many writers on understanding have noted that there’s a phenom-
enal aspect to achieving an instance of understanding.54 This phenom-
enology is varied. This is reflected in how we describe our moments of
moral insight: we are hit by the realization that we must help, it dawns on
us (sometimes painfully) that our remark was inappropriate, we feel that
someone else’s action was morally wrong, we see that we must tell the truth.
The Moral Knowledge Account explains why: imagination, moral percep-
tion, emotional responses, and reflection are all ways of achieving moral
understanding and all have their own distinctive phenomenologies.
VII. SECONDHAND UNDERSTANDING AND THE LIMITS
OF TESTIMONY
The Moral Knowledge Account allows that you can gain instances of moral
understanding by relying on moral testimony: it allows for secondhand
understanding. This chimes well with our moral practice. When we look
to understandwhy an action is right or wrong, weoftendrawon the exper-
tise of those with a wealth of experience and knowledge on that question.
The Moral Knowledge Account explains why having the capacity of moral
understanding is essential for a good moral advisor. We generally look for
moral testimony and advice when we are at a loss about what the right thing
to do is and we want to find out. We are looking for moral knowledge.55
And so, it’s natural that we turn to someone who has the ability to know
what the right thing to do is when presented with the relevant moral evi-
dence, namely, the details of our predicament.
But you may worry that moral testimony still presents a challenge
for the Moral Knowledge Account. Consider Sara. Sara’s ability to arrive
at true moral judgments on her own is extremely limited. But she has ac-
cess to reliable moral advisors, to whom she willingly defers. Doing so,
she generally succeeds in acting rightly. She has the capacity to know right
from wrong, you may argue. But since it’s solely in virtue of her reliable
advisors, we would not credit her with moral understanding.5653. Of course, the reverse is also true. Certain first-order experiences can leave the
agent numb, jaded, or cynical—less likely to notice the needs of others—and so limit
her capacity of moral understanding.
54. See, e.g., Zagzebski, “Recovering Understanding.”
55. I argue for this account of moral advice in Paulina Sliwa, “In Defense of Moral Tes-
timony,” Philosophical Studies 158 (2012): 175–95.
56. I’m grateful to Stephen Grimm and an anonymous referee for raising this objec-
tion.
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ABut the Moral Knowledge Account does not suggest otherwise.
First, to acquire knowledge by testimony, you need to be able to recog-
nize reliable advisors as such. If you cannot discriminate among reliable
and unreliable moral advisors, it’s a matter of luck that you managed to
pick a reliable one. Had you come across an unreliable one, you would
have formed a false belief based on misleading testimony. You are in the
same epistemic position as the agent who happens to pick out the one
accurate history book from a pile of misleading ones. Such epistemic luck
precludes knowledge.57
The ability to recognize a reliable moral advisor requires the capac-
ity to acquire moral knowledge based on evidence other than just moral
testimony. Without moral competence of your own—at the very least, the
ability to recognize kindness, generosity, and good sense when you see
it—you cannot judge other people’s moral competence. Unlike in the
case of doctors and lawyers, there is no external seal of moral approval
that we can rely on.58 Second, recognizing competence is not enough.
People can be competent in a domain and yet a bad source of advice be-
cause they are untrustworthy: they lack integrity, they are sloppy or insin-
cere. But sincerity, integrity, and concern for advising others well are all
moral attributes. Sensitivity to them involves sensitivity tomoral evidence.
As Fricker argues: “Epistemic trust incorporates ethical trust, because
epistemic trustworthiness incorporates one kind of moral trustworthi-
ness: namely, sincerity. Accordingly, the virtuous hearer’s sensitivity to
epistemic saliences will involve a sensitivity to somemoral saliences—see-
ing a speaker in epistemic colour entails seeing them in some moral col-
our.”59 Insofar as Sara’s ability to acquire moral knowledge is seriously
impaired in general, this may preclude her from gaining moral knowl-
edge by testimony. On the Moral Knowledge Account then, the ability
to acquire moral knowledge by testimony is partly constitutive of one’s
capacity of moral understanding. But this does not make the capacity
of moral understanding a free-for-all. Having the ability to acquire moral
knowledge by testimonymakes substantive epistemic demands on the agent.57. Accepting this does not force us to take sides in the debate between reductionists
(e.g., Elizabeth Fricker, “Against Gullibility,” in Knowing from Words, ed. Arindam Chak-
rabarti and Bimal Krishna Matilal [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994], 125–61), and nonreduction-
ists (e.g., Charles Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992]) in the philosophy of testimony. This is because, while antireductionists maintain
that we have a priori warrant for trusting testimony, they also accept that this warrant is de-
feasible. And so, it’s plausible that to be in a position to acquire knowledge by testimony,
you need to be sensitive to at least some of the defeating conditions.
58. See Sliwa, “In Defense,” for more discussion about how to assess moral expertise
without running afoul of general skepticism.
59. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 76.
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ASimply deferring to someone who, as a matter of fact, turns out to be re-
liable does not suffice.
Lack of moral competence on a particular question limits your abil-
ity to gain knowledge by testimony in another way: as we saw earlier, what
you can learn from any particular testimonial exchange depends, in part,
on what you already know and which concepts you have. Thus, suppose
that Sara has never come across the notion of ableism before—she is nei-
ther disabled herself nor knows any people with disabilities, and she has
generally never given the issue any thought. A reliable, trustworthy source
tells her that a given remark is “ableist” and nothing more. If she accepts
the testimony, what has she come to know? It seems that she may well know
that the sentence “this remark is ableist” expresses a truth. She may also
come to know—perhaps, basedon the context or the toneof voice in which
the remark was made—that it expresses some kind of moral criticism, that
it’s some way of saying that the remark is morally unacceptable. But to know
this is not the same thing as having knowledge of the proposition expressed
by the sentence—knowledge that this remark is ableist.
To come to know that the remark is ableist based on testimony, you
need to have some prior background knowledge, both moral and non-
moral, about the kinds of difficulties that agents with disabilities face, as
well as some conceptual competence with respect to the concept of able-
ism. At the same time, youmay not be sensitive enough to the relevant class
of moral evidence yourself to recognize many of the instances in which the
concept applies. And so, relying on someone with greater moral expertise,
you acquire secondhand understanding that making such a remark was
wrong because it is ableist.
On the Moral Knowledge Account the ability to know based onmoral
testimony is part of our capacity of moral understanding. You can achieve
instances of moral understanding by relying on moral testimony that would
otherwise be outside your reach—these are instances of secondhand un-
derstanding.Moral testimony builds on and extends our existingmoral un-
derstanding. It does not create it out of thin air.This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on April 12, 2017 04:07:50 AM
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